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ABSTRACT
A theory-based approach for research on information displays in computer-
supported decision making is proposed. Display characteristics such as the
form, organization, and sequence of information can influence a decision
maker's selection of a decision strategy. Strategy selection can be analyzed
in terms of a trade off between the desire to maximize the accuracy of a
decision and the desire to minimize the effort required to reach that
decision. Differences in displays influence the anticipated effort and
accuracy of each available strategy and, therefore, provide an incentive for
decision makers to use different strategies. Empirical research on the
effects of information displays on strategy selection is reviewed and the
connection between other display research and the strategy selection approach
is discussed. Recommendations for the design and implementation of
information display research are presented.
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ABSTRA CT: A theory-based approach for research
on information displays in computer-supported deci-
sion making is proposed. Display characteristics such
as the form, organization, and sequence of informa-
tion can influence a decision maker's selection of a
decision strategy. Strategy selection can be analyzed
in terms of a trade off between the desire to maximize
the accuracy of a decision and the desire to minimize
the effort required to reach that decision. Differences
in displays influence the anticipated effort and ac-
curacy of each available strategy and, therefore, pro-
vide an incentive for decision makers to use different
strategies. Empirical research on the effects of infor-
mation displays on strategy selection is reviewed and
the connection between other display research and the
strategy selection approach is discussed. Recommen-
dations for the design and implementation of infor-
mation display research are presented.
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Introduction
What is the best way to display information to
decision makers? The answer to this question
is increasingly important because of the com-
puter's ability to rapidly store, manipulate, and
display information. As computers become com-
mon tools in a widening variety of decisions, it
has become clear that characteristics of the com-
puter system itself can influence the decision
process. Both researchers and practitioners have
proposed that the information display is an es-
sential characteristic of all computer-based de-
cision support systems that can be an impor-
tant determinant of the effectiveness of those
systems (DeSanctis, 1984; Ives, 1982; Rubinstein
& Hersh, 1984; Zachary, 1986).
Research-based recommendations about the
impact of information displays on decision pro-
cesses or the advisability of different display op-
tions are slowly emerging (Jarvenpaa & Dick-
son, 1988). However, progress has been lim-
ited by a lack of underlying theory addressing
the impact of displays (Jarvenpaa, Dickson, &:
DeSanctis, 1985). Further, while many studies
have measured the impact of displays on deci-
sion outcomes, few studies have specifically ex-
amined how displays influence the decision pro-
cesses that produce these outcomes (Todd &
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Benbasat, 1987). The purpose of this paper is
to address both of these points by proposing a
cognitive mechanism that accounts for the im-
pact of certain information display variables on
the decision maker's selection of a strategy for
accomplishing complex decision making tasks.
Based on this approach, we make several recom-
mendations for the design and implementation
of display research.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1
describes the specific characteristics of informa-
tion displays that we address in this paper. Sec-
tion 2 outlines the cognitive mechanism for strat-
egy selection in complex decision tasks. This is
used in Section 3 to account for the influence of
information displays on strategy selection. Sec-
tion 4 contains our recommendations for the de-
sign and implementation of display research.
1 Information Display
The number of potential visual representations
of decision problems is virtually infinite. In
thinking about how specific information displays
influence decision making, it would obviously be
useful to have a comprehensive taxonomy of vi-
sual representations. However, only initial ef-
forts addressing specific parts of such a taxon-
omy have been proposed (e.g., Tan & Benbasat,
1989, describe a taxonomy of graphical repre-
sentations of time-series data). In the absence
of a comprehensive taxonomy, we will focus on
three fundamental characteristics that apply to
a broad range of displays: (1) the form of in-
dividual information items in the display, (2)
the organization of display items into meaning-
ful groups or structures, and (3) the sequence
of individual items or groups of items. Later in
the paper, we will argue that these characteris-
tics are likely to influence decision behavior in
predictable ways.
In order to define these display characteristics,
we need to consider the nature of the information
to be presented. Most decision problems have a
common underlying structure: The information
can be represented as a set of locations in multi-
dimensional space, with each location described
by a vector whose elements are locations on the
individual dimensions. The interpretation of a
vector and its elements is determined by the na-
ture of the decision to be made. For instance,
in choice problems, each vector is a decision al-
ternative and the vector elements are attribute
values that describe that alternative (e.g., choos-
ing among cars described by price, comfort, per-
formance, and other attributes). Another exam-
ple is forecasting from multivariate time-series
data, where each vector is a point in time and
the vector elements are observations of various
predictor variables at that point (e.g., predicting
a company's future profits using revenues, oper-
ating expenses, and other financial information
from previous time periods). The function of a
display is to provide the decision maker with a
visual representation of this information.
Form: Individual items of information (i.e.,
the vector elements) can be presented in at least
three distinct forms: numerical, verbal, or pic-
torial. For example, the amount of memory
in a personal computer could be represented as
"640K", "maximum available", or as an image
of a champion weightlifter (as opposed to a 98
pound weakling). There are also numerous vari-
ations possible for a given form. For instance,
numerical representations can include fractions,
decimals, or scientific notation. Verbal informa-
tion can be presented using single words or short
phrases, using specialized terminology or every-
day vocabulary, and in various languages. Picto-
rial forms include common components of charts
(bars, lines, wedges), faces, and numerous other
visual symbols. Variations in all three forms can
be achieved through changes in units of measure-
ment or scaling.
Organization: Another characteristic of dis-
plays is the way in which items on the display
are organized into meaningful structures such as
groups, hierarchies, or patterns. For instance,
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information can be grouped in a table (e.g., a
matrix with each row corresponding to a vector,
each column to a dimension), or as a series of
lists (e.g., paragraphs of text, with each para-
graph describing a vector, as in the case of a
travel guide listing hotels and resorts), or in hier-
archical clusters having more complicated struc-
tures (e.g., labels on consumer products, which
can include both lists and tables). In many dis-
plays, some information is represented by the rel-
ative position of items (e.g., in a line graph, the
vertical positions of the lines reflect the values of
vector elements). Note that some organizations
explicitly depict the relations between items of
information, while others do not. For instance,
the patterns revealed in a line graph depend on
the values of the particular items, while the gen-
eral appearance of a table does not.
Sequence: A given organization does not com-
pletely specify the order in which individual
items or groups of items must appear. For in-
stance, a display may be organized as a series
of lists, but the lists can appear in many dif-
ferent sequences, with the elements of each list
also appearing in many different sequences. Sim-
ilarly, the sequence of rows or columns in a table
can vary. Sequence may be arbitrary, or it may
be based on values of certain elements. For in-
stance, a bar graph that represents a vector of
values might be arranged so that they appear in
decreasing order.
Form, organization, and sequence can, in prin-
ciple, be varied independently. For instance,
in a study of the impact of display organi-
zation on choice strategies, Jarvenpaa (1989)
used bar graphs to replicate earlier studies by
Bettman and colleagues that used tables of num-
bers (Bettman & Kakkar, 1977; Bettman k Zins,
1979). Furthermore, clever and judicious dis-
play design may permit novel combinations of
form, organization, and sequence. For instance,
Chambers, Cleveland, Kleiner, and Tukey (1983)
proposed techniques for representing multivari-
ate data with a tabular arrangement of uni-
variate or bivariate graphical display elements.
Graphical displays can also be composed in
whole or in part from numerical or verbal ele-
ments (e.g., stem-and-leaf plots; also see Tufte,
1983, chapter 7).
Both in practice and in previous research
on information displays, certain combinations
of form, organization, and sequence have been
used more often than others (Jarvenpaa & Dick-
son, 1988). For instance, numerical data are
commonly organized into tabular arrangements,
while there are a variety of standard graphi-
cal arrangements of pictorial elements (e.g., bar
charts, scatter plots, and so on). Verbal infor-
mation is most often arranged in sentences and
paragraphs of text, though tabular arrangements
are not uncommon. However, displays are often
composed of a mixture of forms (e.g., tables or
running text containing both words and num-
bers, graphics using words and numbers to label
and scale the data elements). The influence of
displays on decision processes may be easier to
understand by aggregating the individual influ-
ences of these component characteristics.
2 Effort and Accuracy in
Strategy Selection
Information display characteristics are just one
type of task feature that can influence decision
processes. This section outlines a general ap-
proach for understanding how decision makers
adapt to decision tasks. Decision tasks are de-
fined by a goal to be accomplished and the envi-
ronment in which it is accomplished (see Newell
& Simon, 1972, ch. 3). Decision making encom-
passes a large number of possible tasks, including
(1) choice under conditions of either certainty or
uncertainty, (2) evaluative judgment, (3) predic-
tive judgment, and (4) inferential judgment (see
Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981, for a discussion of the
connection between judgment and choice). In all
of these tasks, there are generally many strate-
gies for accomplishing the goal. We assume that
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decision makers engage in an initial planning
stage, in which they select a strategy to imple-
ment. In what follows, we develop a theoretical
account of this planning process, which is then
used to account for the influence of information
display characteristics on decision processes.
We define a strategy for a task as a sequence of
information processes that is intended to achieve
the goal. Not only are there many strategies for
a given task but the set of strategies available
for one task is generally different from that for
another task (Newell k Simon, 1972, ch. 14).
For example, strategies used for evaluative judg-
ment have been found to differ substantially
from those used for choice (Billings k Scherer,
1988; Schkade k Johnson, 1989; Tversky, Slovic,
k Kahneman, in press). However, while the set
of strategies available varies across tasks, the
planning process is essentially the same.
The most important similarity is that decision
makers adapt to variations in features of a given
task by selecting different strategies. Decision
makers have been observed to switch strategies
in response to variations in problem complexity,
response mode, similarity of alternatives, and
characteristics of the information display, among
other features (Payne, 1982). For instance, deci-
sion makers respond to an increase in the num-
ber of alternatives in a choice task by switch-
ing to simpler, less accurate strategies (Payne,
1976). One explanation for this strategy switch-
ing is that decision makers engage in a form of
cognitive cost-benefit analysis, trading off var-
ious positive and negative dimensions of alter-
native strategies for a task. If the features of a
given task change, then the costs and benefits as-
sociated with each strategy may also change. If
this change is large enough to alter the balance
of costs and benefits, then a different strategy
would be selected. 1
'We wish to clearly distinguish between variations in
tasks (e.g., judgment versus choice) and variations in fea-
tures of a given task (e.g., different levels of problem com-
plexity). In this paper, we are primarily concerned with
the influence of variations in features of a given task, par-
Our approach focuses on two particular di-
mensions of strategies: (1) the cognitive effort
required to use a strategy, and (2) the ability
of a strategy to produce an accurate ("correct")
response. Strategy selection can be analyzed
as the product of a trade-off between the de-
sire to maximize the probability of producing a
correct decision and the desire to minimize the
expenditure of cognitive resources (Johnson k
Payne, 1985). Accuracy has typically been de-
fined relative to a criterion such as a norma-
tively appropriate (optimal) response or some
other relevant benchmark (Einhorn k Hogarth,
1981, pp. 55-61; Hogarth, 1981; March, 1978;
Simon, 1978). Effort has typically been de-
fined as the total expenditure of cognitive re-
sources required to complete the task, as re-
flected by measures like total decision time or
total number of cognitive operations (Johnson,
1979; Kahneman, 1973; Russo k Dosher, 1983).
Since both the accuracy and effort associated
with a strategy may vary with changes in task
features, different strategies will provide the
best trade-off in different situations (Beach k
Mitchell, 1978; Bettman, Johnson, k Payne, in
press; Christensen-Szalanski, 1978, 1980; John-
son, 1979; Johnson & Payne, 1985; Klayman,
1983; Payne, 1976; Payne, Bettman, k John-
son, 1988; Russo k Dosher, 1983; Shugan, 1980;
Thorngate, 1980; Wright, 1974, 1975). I* has
also been suggested that factors other than accu-
racy and effort may influence strategy selection
(e.g., justifiability; see Beach k Mitchell, 1978).
Accuracy and related concepts, such as de-
cision quality, have a well established place in
the study of decision making. In contrast, while
cognitive effort has played an important role
in other areas of cognitive psychology, it has
only recently been introduced to decision mak-
ing research. Concepts like reduction of cog-
nitive strain and conservation of cognitive re-
ticularly features of the display. To avoid confusion, we
will refer to features of the task related to the display
as display characteristics and all other features as task
features.
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sources have been used to account for perfor-
mance in simple cognitive tasks like concept for-
mation (Bruner, Goodnow, &: Austin, 1956),
mental arithmetic (Dansereau, 1969), and selec-
tive attention (Kahneman, 1973). These con-
cepts have been extended to more complex tasks
like problem solving (Newell & Simon, 1972; Si-
mon & Hayes, 1976) and, recently, decision mak-
ing (Payne, 1982). Seemingly minor variations
in task features can lead to dramatic variations
in the time required to use a particular strat-
egy. For instance, Dansereau (1969) found that
completion times in a simple mental arithmetic
task varied by a factor of as much as 100 across
apparently similar problems. In a more complex
problem solving task, Kotovsky, Hayes, and Si-
mon (1985) found that completion times for iso-
morphic versions of the same problem varied by
a factor of as much as 16.
When selecting a strategy, the effort and ac-
curacy associated with various strategies are un-
certain quantities and must be estimated by de-
cision makers. Strategy selection is a subjective
process, based upon a decision maker's percep-
tions of effort and accuracy (Beach & Mitchell,
1978). One source of uncertainty may be un-
predictability or ambiguity in the task. Another
source may be limitations in the decision maker's
knowledge about the task. This problem is likely
to be most pronounced when the task is unfamil-
iar or after unexpected changes in the task envi-
ronment have occurred. Thus, strategy selection
depends upon a decision maker's anticipations of
effort and accuracy.
Decision makers may be better at estimat-
ing effort than accuracy. For example, Johnson
and Payne (1985) suggest that decision makers'
self-knowledge concerning cognitive processes is
likely to be much more complete with respect
to effort than accuracy, because feedback about
the ease with which decision processes are im-
plemented is usually more immediate and read-
ily interpretable than outcome feedback. On
the other hand, decision makers often have dif-
ficulty learning about accuracy because many
environments provide outcome feedback that is
incomplete, ambiguous, and subject to long de-
lays (Einhorn, 1980; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978).
Learning about accuracy can be difficult even in
the presence of complete and accurate outcome
feedback (Brehmer, 1980). Furthermore, since
the criteria for accuracy can vary widely across
different decisions, it may be difficult to accumu-
late comparable experiences about the accuracy
of a given strategy. In contrast, cognitive effort
is probably easier to compare across decisions,
because the subjective experience of expending
cognitive resources (e.g., as reflected in the time
required to make a decision) is similar from one
situation to the next.
A theoretical understanding of strategy selec-
tion is still evolving and some empirical find-
ings have not yet been accounted for by this
approach. For instance, Payne (1982) reviewed
several experiments in which decision makers'
responses to variations in problem presentation
seem to be governed by basic principles of hu-
man perception rather than cost-benefit consid-
erations. The best known phenomena of this
type involve the shifts in preferences that are ob-
served when the same problem is framed in dif-
ferent ways (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; also
see Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Thaler, 1980,
1985). One reason why cost-benefit explanations
have not yet accounted for framing effects may
be that the problems studied were so simple that
planning could not play a meaningful role. How-
ever, a cost-benefit approach focusing on effort
and accuracy does appears capable of analysis
and prediction of strategy selection across a va-
riety of complex decision making situations.
3 Information Displays
Strategy Selection
and
While many different task features can influence
strategy selection, information displays deserve
particular attention in the context of computer-
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based decision support systems. A system de-
signer may have limited control over other task
features, but display characteristics can be di-
rectly controlled. Moreover, because every sys-
tem must have an information display, these de-
sign decisions can not be avoided. Display de-
sign is important because the system designer
can exert indirect control over strategy selection
through direct control of display characteristics.
A simple yet compelling demonstration of this
indirect control was provided by Russo (1977),
who was able to induce changes in purchase pat-
terns in a supermarket through a simple reor-
ganization of the display of product informa-
tion. Specifically, he gathered unit price in-
formation on a single list that permitted shop-
pers to make less effortful comparisons than were
possible while walking down the supermarket
aisle. The result was a significant shift in ac-
tual purchase decisions to products with lower
unit prices. Although Russo's experiment did
not use computer-based information displays,
one can easily imagine a similar situation where
consumers obtain product information entirely
from a computer. In fact, product information
may soon be routinely obtained from distributed
databases and actual purchase decisions based
in whole or in part on information derived from
computer displays (e.g., via networks such as
CompuServe).
3.1 Displays as Cognitive Incentives
A number of other studies, reviewed below, also
suggest that differences in information displays
influence strategy selection through changes in
either the effort or the accuracy with which var-
ious information processing activities can be ac-
complished. Together with task features and
decision maker knowledge, information displays
implicitly define a cognitive incentive system for
decision makers. Specifically, differences in dis-
plays, task features, and decision maker knowl-
edge change the anticipated effort and accuracy
of each available strategy and, therefore, provide
an incentive for decision makers to use different
strategies (see Figure 1). Presumably, a major
source of decision maker knowledge is learning
from previous experience, so that the experi-
enced effort and accuracy of past decisions will
influence subsequent anticipations.
We propose that the effects of displays on
strategies should be analyzed in terms of the ef-
fects of displays on components of those strate-
gies. Because decision making tasks are often
complex and human information processing ca-
pabilities are limited, decision strategies gener-
ally achieve their goal by breaking the task into
a sequence of simpler subtasks. Thus, strategies
can be described as a sequence of simpler sub-
strategies that are intended to achieve each of
these subtasks (Newell & Simon, 1972, ch. 14).
For example, substrategies can be associated
with distinct stages of decision making (e.g., in-
formation acquisition, evaluation), simple sub-
tasks (e.g., pattern recognition, summarizing in-
formation), or with more elementary cognitive
operations (e.g., multiplication, comparison, re-
trieval from memory). The influence of display
characteristics on a strategy's effort and accu-
racy thus becomes the aggregate of the influences
on the effort and accuracy of each component
substrategy.
To illustrate how differences in displays can in-
fluence a single substrategy, imagine a decision
maker who must choose a new computer system
from a set of available alternatives. Each system
is described by a set of attributes (e.g., price,
ease of use, expandability, and speed). Consider
a manipulation of display organization in which
the information can be presented either one sys-
tem at a time (i.e., the values of all attributes
for a single system on the same screen) or one
attribute at a time (i.e., each screen contains
the values of one attribute for all systems). A
common substrategy in many choice strategies
2 For completeness, we could have included a number
of feedback loops in Figure 1 (e.g., from experienced effort
to decision maker knowledge). These have been omitted
for clarity.
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Characteristics
Task
Features
Decision Maker
Knowledge
Anticipated Effort
Anticipated Accuracy
Strategy
Decision
I 1
-| Experienced Effort
I I
I 1
Outcomes H Experienced Accuracy
I I
Figure 1: Overview of the Strategy Selection Process
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is comparing the values of two systems on the
same attribute. The first type of display, orga-
nized around systems, does not present the two
values simultaneously, while the second type of
display, organized around attributes, does. This
means that a comparison of this type will be
more effortful with the first than with the sec-
ond type of display.
Now consider a manipulation of display form,
where the system attributes can be presented ei-
ther as a set of lists of numbers or as a set of
bar charts, where each list or bar chart presents
the attribute values for a single alternative. An-
other common operation, extracting the numer-
ical value of a particular attribute for a partic-
ular system, can be accomplished with a rela-
tively small chance of error when the informa-
tion is presented as numbers. In contrast, ex-
tracting a numerical value from a bar chart is a
more error-prone procedure because the decision
maker must visually project the height of the ap-
propriate bar onto the chart's scale (Simkin &
Hastie, 1987). Thus, the accuracy of this sub-
strategy will probably be lower with this type of
graphical display.
The influence of display differences on the ef-
fort and accuracy of substrategies is important
because strategies make use of particular sub-
strategies to differing degrees. For instance,
some strategies for choice require many com-
parisons across systems (e.g., majority of con-
firming dimensions or additive difference strate-
gies) while there are other strategies that do few
if any comparisons of this type (e.g., conjunc-
tive or weighted additive strategies; see Sven-
son, 1979). Thus, changing a display in a way
that makes this type of comparison easier (e.g.,
switching from sequential to simultaneous dis-
play organization) would decrease the effort re-
quired for the former strategies more than for the
latter. Similarly, choice strategies that use nu-
merical calculations require many extractions of
numerical values (e.g., weighted additive strat-
egy), while many other strategies do not (e.g.,
the majority of confirming dimensions strategy
requires no numerical value extractions, while
the elimination-by-aspects strategy requires only
a relatively small number). Thus, changing to a
display that makes numerical value extractions
less accurate (e.g., changing form from num-
bers to bars) would affect the accuracy of the
weighted additive strategy more than the oth-
ers.
It is important to note that these effects do
not exist in isolation. For instance, a single
display change may influence both the accu-
racy and effort associated with a substrategy
—
numerical value extraction from line graphs or
bar charts may be both less accurate and more
effortful than from numerical displays (Jarven-
paa & Dickson, 1988). However, the support a
given display provides to one substrategy may be
offset by the impact on other substrategies used
by the same strategy. For instance, switching
from a table to a bar chart may make numerical
value extractions more difficult and less accu-
rate, but on the other hand, recognizing trends
or doing comparisons may become easier and
more accurate (e.g., Vessey & Galletta, 1988).
Since strategies make use of numerical value ex-
tractions, trend recognition, and comparisons to
varying degrees, the impact of a particular dis-
play on a particular strategy will be the product
of the aggregate influence on all these component
substrategies.
It is this aggregate influence of displays on the
effort and accuracy of strategies that forms the
basis for the strategy selection process. Consider
the anticipated accuracy and effort of four hy-
pothetical strategies with two different displays,
shown in Figure 2. For instance, the points A
and A' mark the anticipated accuracy and ef-
fort of the same strategy for the two different
displays. Here, anticipated accuracy is scaled
relative to the accuracy levels of the most and
least accurate strategies (e.g., utility maximiza-
tion and random choice; adapted from Johnson
&: Payne, 1985). Similarly, anticipated effort is
Cognitive Processes and Information Displays
Maximum
Accuracy
Anticipated
Relative
Accuracy
Minimum
Accuracy
Maximum
Effort
Decreasing
Anticipated Effort
Minimum
Effort
Display 1: Strategies A, B, C, D
Display 2: Strategies A' , B\ C\ D'
Figure 2: Effects of Display on Effort-Accuracy Trade-offs
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scaled relative to the effort levels required to im-
plement the most and least effortful strategies.
Because expending less effort is more desirable,
the horizontal axis represents decreasing effort
levels.
Note that for Display 1, strategy A dominates
strategies B and D, achieving a higher degree of
accuracy while requiring less effort. However, for
Display 2, A' no longer dominates B'—although
B' is still less accurate than A', it is now less
effortful as well. On the other hand, strategy B'
now dominates both C and D' . More generally,
for a particular display, strategies can be classi-
fied into two groups, dominated and nondomi-
nated. The nondominated strategies define a set
of efficient alternatives—within this efficient set,
increased accuracy can only be achieved by se-
lecting a more effortful strategy, while reduced
effort can only be achieved by selecting a less
accurate strategy. Thus, under Display 1, a
decision maker who believes minimizing effort
is more important than maximizing accuracy
might prefer strategy C, while a decision maker
who places more emphasis on accuracy might se-
lect strategy A. The composition of this efficient
set will not necessarily be the same for different
displays (e.g., the efficient set {A,C} for Dis-
play 1 versus {A\ B'} for Display 2). Thus, the
relative attractiveness of various decision strate-
gies depends on the display, and decision makers
should adapt to changes in displays by selecting
different strategies.
3.2 Empirical Research on Displays
and Strategy Selection
This subsection reviews those studies that are di-
rectly relevant to our arguments—studies specif-
ically examining the connection between infor-
mation display and strategy selection. Our re-
view examines, in turn, the influence of form, or-
ganization, and sequence and concludes with a
critical evaluation of the existing evidence. The
following subsection (3.3) examines the relation
between other information display research and
the strategy selection approach. More compre-
hensive reviews can be found elsewhere (e.g.,
Bettman, Payne, & Staelin, 1986; DeSanctis,
1984; Jarvenpaa & Dickson, 1988).
3.2.1 Form
Several studies have compared quantitative ver-
sus qualitative forms of information. Informa-
tion in qualitative forms (e.g., words or pictures)
can increase the effort required to use strategies
that use numerical calculations. Since these rep-
resentations do not present explicit numerical
values, these values must be obtained through
an effortful process of translation or estimation
prior to computation (Larkin & Simon, 1987).
For example, it is difficult to compute the dif-
ference between attribute values represented as
"fair" and "excellent".
In two experiments using choice tasks in which
information was presented using either numbers
or words, decision makers were observed to shift
their decision strategies to avoid expenditures
of effort: Huber (1980) found that operations
within an attribute (such as finding the alterna-
tive with the maximum value on a specific at-
tribute) were less frequent when attribute val-
ues were represented by words. Similarly, Stone
and Schkade (in press) found that decision mak-
ers used significantly fewer search and combi-
nation operations within attributes when val-
ues were represented by words than they did
when presented with equivalent numerical val-
ues. Surprisingly, although many studies have
used a mix of quantitative and qualitative in-
formation in the same task (e.g., Bettman &
Kakkar, 1977; Payne, 1976), there have been no
systematic studies of the effects of mixing these
forms (but see Tversky, 1969, for a discussion of
this issue).
In two judgment tasks, assigning ratings or
selling prices for lotteries, Johnson, Payne, and
Bettman (1988) found that decision makers were
less likely to select strategies that used numerical
computations when probabilities were presented
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as complicated fractions rather than as simple
decimals. They explained this strategy shift in
terms of the relative ease of computations with
simple decimals.
Another interpretation of these studies is pos-
sible. Some operations are prohibitively difficult
to execute when information is presented in cer-
tain forms, thus precluding the use of strate-
gies that employ these operations. For exam-
ple, Simkin and Hastie (1987) argue when in-
formation is presented in graphs, decision mak-
ers may select strategies that employ operations
that are not well-defined for words or numbers
(e.g., a "projection" operation that mentally ex-
tends a line segment). Similarly, it is impossible
to directly "multiply" two words. If there are
important differences in the sets of basic oper-
ations that are meaningful for various display
forms, then the set of available strategies will
also change. If a familiar strategy is not avail-
able, a decision maker's only recourse would be
to either perform an effortful translation of the
information into a compatible form or to select
a different strategy. This may provide an alter-
native explanation for results of the words ver-
sus numbers studies cited above, and is an issue
that deserves attention in future research (e.g.,
in studies of tables versus graphs).
3.2.2 Organization
Studies of organization have focused on simulta-
neous versus sequential presentation of informa-
tion. One set of studies observed choice behavior
in tasks where information displayed in book-
lets or on loose sheets of paper was presented
sequentially by alternative, sequentially by at-
tribute, or simultaneously (Bettman & Kakkar,
1977; Bettman & Zins, 1979; Jarvenpaa, 1989).
Each page presented the values of all alterna-
tives for one attribute, the values of all at-
tributes for one alternative, or a grouped presen-
tation containing all the alternatives and their
attribute values. Bettman and colleagues used
tabular displays of numerical data, while Jar-
venpaa used bar graphs. When sequential dis-
plays were organized by alternative (making op-
erations across alternatives inconvenient), sub-
jects tended to use alternative-oriented strate-
gies such as the weighted additive and conjunc-
tive rules. In contrast, when sequential dis-
plays were organized by attribute (making oper-
ations within an alternative inconvenient), sub-
jects tended to use attribute-oriented strategies
such as the elimination-by-aspects and additive
difference rules. In the grouped (simultaneous)
data presentations, both types of strategies were
used, but with differing conclusions in the three
studies about which type of strategy predomi-
nates.
The results of these three studies can be in-
terpreted in terms of cognitive incentives: At-
tribute based presentations encourage attribute
based operations, since obtaining and working
with information presented on the same page is
easier than when it is on different pages (partic-
ularly when pages are arranged in booklets that
prevent holding two pages side by side). Simi-
larly, alternative based presentations encourage
alternative based operations, while grouped pre-
sentations seem to be relatively neutral, so that
direction of processing is left to the preferences
and predilections of the decision maker.
Significantly, field studies have observed dis-
play induced changes in consumer choices that
are consistent with these three laboratory stud-
ies. Russo's (1977) study of how display orga-
nization influenced the use of unit price infor-
mation was discussed earlier. Two other exper-
iments investigated the influence of display or-
ganization on the use of nutritional information
in supermarkets (both experiments are reported
by Russo, Staelin, Nolan, Russell, &: Metcalf,
1986). One experiment varied the organization
of displays presenting the levels of positive nu-
trients (e.g., vitamins and minerals) contained
in various food products. In particular, several
displays were specifically intended to reduce the
effort required to search for and process this in-
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formation. The researchers hypothesized that
these displays would lead to greater use of nu-
tritional information and a shift in purchase be-
havior toward more nutritious products. While
consumers were observed to read and attend to
these displays, there were no changes in purchase
behavior. The second experiment attempted a
similar display manipulation with a negative nu-
trient, the amount of sugar contained in various
products. In this case, there was a significant
shift toward purchase of foods with lower sugar
content. Although there were many differences
between the two studies, the authors argue that
the principal difference was that the perceived
benefit of increasing levels of positive nutrients
was less than the perceived benefits of reduc-
ing negative nutrients. Display manipulations
intended to reduce effort may only be effective if
the perceived benefits of using the information
are significant.
3.2.3 Sequence
The sequence in which information is presented
may influence decision processes because it af-
fects the physical proximity of items of informa-
tion on the display. For instance, the first and
second item on a list will be closer together than
the first and last. Russo and Rosen (1975) ob-
served strong proximity effects in an analysis of
eye movements in a choice task. Although only
47% of possible pairs of alternatives were spa-
tially adjacent, 63% of all paired comparisons
between alternatives and 73% of all sequential
search operations were between adjacent alter-
natives, results that the authors attributed to
ease of processing considerations.
Engineering psychologists have also empha-
sized the importance of spatial proximity of in-
formation in the design of instrument displays
(e.g., Wickens, 1987). Spatial proximity induces
the use of simple strategies for scanning infor-
mation displays: For instance, lists tend to be
scanned from start to finish, while matrix dis-
plays tend to be scanned starting in the upper
left-hand corner and proceeding along rows or
columns (Bettman &: Kakkar, 1977; Russo &
Rosen, 1975). This tendency to scan in the order
in which the information is presented is impor-
tant since decision makers have been shown to
assign greater weight to information that is pre-
sented either at the beginning or the end of a
sequence (i.e., primacy and recency, see Ander-
son, 1981; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1989).
3.2.4 Critical Evaluation
These studies of the influence of form, organiza-
tion, and sequence are consistent with the idea
that decision makers respond adaptively, select-
ing strategies in response to the cognitive incen-
tives induced by the display. Taken as a whole,
this evidence is strong enough to warrant pur-
suing the effort-accuracy approach to display re-
search further. On the other hand, we do not
wish to overstate the strength of this evidence,
since these studies are relatively few in number
and may be criticized in several other respects.
First, most of these studies use multiattribute
choice tasks. Clearly, research in this area needs
to be extended to judgment tasks of various
types. Studying the influence of display char-
acteristics on strategy selection in an evaluative
judgment task or a prediction task would help
to test the limits of the approach.
Second, only a restricted range of display char-
acteristics have been studied. For instance,
while the evidence on information sequence dis-
cussed above is suggestive, these studies did not
explicitly manipulate sequence, nor have any
studies examined the influence of combinations
of form, organization, and sequence. Further-
more, most of these studies use tabular displays
of information. A significant exception is the
study by Jarvenpaa (1989), which successfully
extended previous research on strategy selection
into the realm of graphic displays with results
that were essentially consistent with previous
studies of tabular displays. This study demon-
strates the feasibility of applying the cost-benefit
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approach to graphical displays. Also, Simkin
and Hastie (1987) have provided some useful
conceptual and methodological developments for
comparing different graphical displays, particu-
larly the identification of additional elementary
operations or substrategies. These developments
will facilitate the application of the strategy se-
lection approach to a broader range of displays.
Finally, none of the studies to date have fo-
cused explicitly on the distinction between an-
ticipated and experienced effort and accuracy.
It is possible that decision makers' anticipations
will differ systematically from the actual levels of
effort and accuracy they will experience. How-
ever, no study to date has even attempted to
measure anticipations. We will discuss this issue
further in section 4.
To summarize, these studies are consistent
with our theoretical interpretation of the influ-
ence of displays on strategy selection. However,
they suffer from limited generalizability with re-
spect to both task and display. There are a
number of studies in the literature that examine
other displays and other tasks, though they do
not deal directly with strategy selection. Next,
we will discuss the relevance of this research for
understanding the relation between displays and
strategy selection.
3.3 Other Display Research
As noted earlier, most of the research on dis-
plays has been concerned with decision outcomes
rather than decision processes and, therefore,
did not collect evidence relevant to strategy se-
lection. Some researchers have argued that this
literature can be interpreted in terms of how
appropriate a display is for the task being per-
formed (Benbasat, Dexter, k Todd, 1986b; De-
Sanctis, 1984; Jarvenpaa k Dickson, 1988; Jar-
venpaa et al., 1985; Vessey, 1988). The idea is
that both effort and errors can be minimized by
selecting the right display for the task (i.e., the
display that matches the task). Because a given
display may match one task but not another,
the appropriateness of the display depends on
the task. For instance, a major theme of these
studies has been to compare the influences of
tables and graphs. In their comprehensive re-
view, Jarvenpaa and Dickson (1988) conclude
that graphs are superior for summarizing data,
recognizing trends, and comparing points and
patterns, while tables are superior for value ex-
traction.
What is the connection between the match-
ing approach and the strategy selection mech-
anism discussed in this paper? One important
difference is that studies investigating the match
between displays and tasks treat task as an in-
dependent variable. In contrast, our analysis
assumes that the task is held constant while
treating the display and task features as inde-
pendent variables. Another important differ-
ence is that matching has been most success-
ful in explaining display effects in relatively sim-
ple tasks (e.g., trend recognition, comparisons,
value extraction), while strategy selection re-
search has been largely concerned with more
complex tasks (e.g., multiattribute choice). To
illustrate, Jarvenpaa and Dickson (1988) found
that the matching concept worked well for el-
ementary tasks, but for studies of higher-level
decision tasks, the results were inconclusive. In
contrast, the strategy selection approach has ac-
counted for display effects in complex choice
problems (reviewed above), but has been less
successful for simple perceptual judgments (e.g.,
framing effects; see Payne, 1982).
One possibility is that matching and strategy
selection are distinct concepts that can not be
applied to the same tasks. In introducing the
cost-benefit approach, we emphasized that it ap-
plied to complex tasks in which the notion of
planning (i.e., selecting a strategy) was mean-
ingful. For elementary tasks, like point-reading
or pattern recognition, strategy selection may be
less useful than the matching approach for un-
derstanding the influence of displays. Because
there are generally many equivalent means to
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achieve the goal in these simple tasks, strate-
gies will differ little with respect to effort and
accuracy (Brunswik, 1952). Thus, strategy se-
lection may have little significance, because the
effort required to choose among the equivalent
strategies will exceed any benefit to be derived.
The results of one series of studies illustrate
the possibility of matching displays to complex
tasks. Benbasat and colleagues used a budget al-
location task to investigate the effects of graphi-
cal and color-enhanced information presentation
formats on decision time and performance (Ben-
basat & Dexter, 1985, 1986; Benbasat, Dexter,
& Todd, 1986a, 1986b). The authors suggested
that this task can be decomposed into discrete
phases (i.e., subtasks) and that effective perfor-
mance for each phase is best supported by differ-
ent display types. Specifically, they argued that
the early stages require qualitative judgments of
relative trends and slopes and that graphs are
more appropriate than tables. However, later
in the task, when precise quantitative responses
are required, they argued tables are more appro-
priate than graphs, since exact numerical val-
ues can be obtained both easily and accurately.
This reasoning implies that a combined tabular-
graphical display might be better than either
alone, since the decision maker could use the ap-
propriate format for each stage of the problem.
In the only study that investigated a combined
format, they found it to be both the fastest and
the most accurate (Benbasat et al., 1986b).
For complex (i.e., higher-level) tasks, the
matching and strategy selection approaches may
be compatible. Our account of strategy selection
provides a mechanism that can explicitly map
out how display characteristics can influence ef-
fort and accuracy in a particular task. Recall
that strategies for complex tasks achieve their
goal by defining a series of subtasks. A display
will match a complex task to the extent that the
efficient strategies for the given task require sub-
tasks (and therefore, substrategies) that match
the display. In another task, that same display
might not match as well because the efficient
strategies for that task may rely on subtasks that
do not match the display. Because these sub-
tasks include the elementary tasks often studied
in the matching literature, the results of match-
ing studies can be used as building blocks for
studies of strategy selection in complex tasks.
4 Issues for Research
We have proposed that information displays in-
fluence decision making through the process of
strategy selection. Specifically, differences in dis-
plays change the anticipated effort and accuracy
of each available strategy and, therefore, pro-
vide an incentive for decision makers to use dif-
ferent strategies. Furthermore, the aggregate ef-
fects of displays on strategies should be analyzed
in terms of the effects of displays on compo-
nent substrategies. Researchers concerned with
computer-based decision support need to move
beyond simply measuring whether a display in-
fluences decision outcomes and should focus on
how and why display characteristics influence
the decision processes that produce these out-
comes. Pursuing a strategy selection approach
raises a number of issues in the design and im-
plementation of display research. We address,
in turn, issues related to measurement of depen-
dent variables, research design issues, issues re-
lated to the distinction between anticipated and
experienced effort and accuracy, and finally, pos-
sible extensions of the cost-benefit approach to
other aspects of decision support systems.
4.1 Dependent Variables
Our emphasis on cognitive processes implies that
researchers should design experiments that in-
clude dependent variables intended to measure
strategy selection and effort in addition to the
standard measures of decision quality or accu-
racy. These measures can be obtained using
process-tracing methods like verbal protocols,
information search records, and decision time
Cognitive Processes and Information Displays 15
(Johnson, Payne, Schkade, & Bettman, 1988;
Payne, Braunstein, & Carroll, 1978). Protocols
and search records can be coded and analyzed
in order to make inferences about the strategies
used by decision makers. Total decision time
provides one overall measure of experienced ef-
fort, and more detailed timing data can be used
to analyze the effort associated with basic cog-
nitive operations or substrategies (Chase, 1978;
Posner & McLeod, 1982). To illustrate, Payne
and colleagues (1988) used the following depen-
dent variables to make inferences about strate-
gies in a risky choice task: amount of informa-
tion acquired, average time spent per acquisi-
tion, proportion of acquisition time devoted to
the most important attribute, proportion of time
spent on probability rather than payoff informa-
tion, variances of several of the previously men-
tioned measures, and various codings of the se-
quential pattern of information search. A de-
tailed discussion of coding and analyzing process
tracing data can be found elsewhere (Carroll &
Johnson, 1989; Ericsson & Simon, 1984).
Using verbal protocols to study displays with
graphical elements may be more challenging be-
cause decision makers can have difficulty artic-
ulating valid verbal statements about visual en-
codings (Ericsson & Simon, 1984). However, at
least one study has successfully used verbal pro-
tocols with displays of this type (e.g., Jarvenpaa,
1989). In addition, other process-tracing meth-
ods, particularly eye-movement data, may prove
effective (Russo, 1978).
Our discussion has emphasized that there are
some important variables that mediate the rela-
tion between display characteristics and decision
outcomes—decision makers anticipate the effort
and accuracy of different strategies and adap-
tively select an efficient strategy for the task and
display at hand. To test this connection, display
experiments should ideally measure all of the fol-
lowing dependent variables: (1) Anticipated ef-
fort and accuracy, (2) strategy, (3) effort- related
measures like decision time, and (4) decision
quality or accuracy. Of these four categories,
only the first has not been examined in previous
research. Anticipations must, by definition, be
measured prior to performing the task. This can
be accomplished by asking for direct estimates of
the effort and accuracy that the decision maker
expects to achieve. One way to do this would be
to present the decision maker with a list of pos-
sible strategies, and request predictions of effort
and accuracy for each strategy. Another way
would be to use indirect measures, such as pre-
senting examples of displays and strategies and
asking the decision maker to express preferences
among them.
Recent developments in the use of computer
simulation techniques may prove to be helpful in
developing and operationalizing the cost-benefit
approach to strategy selection. Johnson and
Payne (1985) proposed a method for measuring
the effort associated with decision strategies by
decomposing strategies into a sequence of com-
ponent processes, called elementary information
processes (EIPs). These components, which are
similar to the simple substrategies discussed ear-
lier, are basic cognitive operations thought to
be common to a wide variety of tasks (Chase,
1978; Newell & Simon, 1972). Examples include
reading an item of information into short-term
memory, adding two numerical items together,
and comparing two items. Once a set of de-
cision strategies is decomposed into a common
set of EIPs, Monte-Carlo simulation techniques
can be used to observe the choice made by each
strategy over a large number of decisions while
also counting the number of times each compo-
nent operation is executed. A measure of effort
can be calculated from the total number of com-
ponent operations required to execute a partic-
ular strategy in a particular task. Total deci-
sion time can also be predicted either with this
measure or with a slightly refined measure, mul-
tiplying the number of times each EIP is used
by an estimate of the time required to execute
that EIP. This approach has been used to predict
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total decision time of subjects in a choice task
(Bettman et al., in press) and task completion
times in experiments involving other cognitive
tasks (Card, Moran, & Newell, 1983; Carpenter
& Just, 1975).
This simulation approach is valuable for sev-
eral reasons: (1) Simulations incorporating com-
ponential analyses of this type permit a va-
riety of decision strategies to be investigated
over many variations in task features. Simula-
tion experiments that systematically vary dis-
play characteristics, task features, and strate-
gies are capable of exploring the complex in-
teractions among these factors. (2) Developing
the simulations requires the researcher to spec-
ify the task features and the decision strategies
in great detail. This can help to uncover hidden
assumptions and gaps in knowledge that might
otherwise go unnoticed. (3) Results from simu-
lations can be used to predict the efficient set of
strategies for a particular display in a particu-
lar task and to provide quantitative predictions
of both effort and accuracy. These predictions
place the theory at risk of disconfirmation, an
important component of cumulative theory de-
velopment (Meehl, 1978; Popper, 1959). This
predictive test can be accomplished by directly
comparing simulation results to the results of ex-
periments: Do decision makers actually select
strategies that the simulation identifies as effi-
cient? Do measures of decision time and decision
quality agree with the simulation's estimates of
effort and accuracy? Deviations from predicted
behavior could also provide insight into the con-
nection between anticipated and experienced ef-
fort and accuracy. For instance, suppose that a
decision maker uses a strategy that the simula-
tion identifies as inefficient. This might occur if
the strategy appears to be efficient on the ba-
sis of the decision maker's biased anticipations.
Thus, when simulations and actual behaviors fail
to agree, biased anticipations provide one possi-
ble explanation for the disagreement.
Using the simulation approach generally re-
quires the following four steps: (1) formally
describe the environment (e.g., specification of
goals, constraints, problem structure, require-
ments for a solution, and so on); (2) character-
ize the set of available strategies (e.g., identify
critical stages or subtasks and describe potential
solutions for each); (3) describe each strategy
as an organized sequence of substrategies (e.g.,
a production system; Newell & Simon, 1972);
and (4) analyze the impact of displays on ele-
mentary operations and use the strategy descrip-
tions to determine the aggregate impact on each
strategy (e.g., operationalize the strategies as
computer programs and use Monte Carlo tech-
niques). Note that these steps can be accom-
plished without formal simulation methods: In
our examples in section 3.1, as in most previous
cognitive cost-benefit studies, we derived quali-
tative predictions about the direction of display
effects through an informal mental simulation.
While the mental simulation approach has the
practical advantage of being easy to implement,
it lacks the quantitative precision of formal sim-
ulation methods and may fail to detect impor-
tant interactions between display characteristics
and task features (see Payne et al., 1988, for an
illustration of the advantages of the formal ap-
proach).
4.2 Designs
Our approach also suggests some issues for the
choice of independent variables and research de-
signs. Figure 1 identifies three categories of inde-
pendent variables that could be included in ex-
periments: display characteristics, task features,
and decision maker knowledge. We will discuss
each of these in turn.
What display characteristics should be stud-
ied? The approach advocated here is to ana-
lyze displays in terms of form, organization, and
sequence. The strategy selection research dis-
cussed above has typically manipulated these
factors one at a time. The obvious alternative
would be to examine them in combination. As
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an example, consider the studies of display or-
ganization discussed above (section 3.2.2). Jar-
venpaa's (1989) study was noteworthy because
it used a different information form yet pro-
duced results similar to previous studies. How-
ever, an even more compelling design would have
been to examine form and organization in the
same experiment—comparing simultaneous and
sequential organizations using both numerical
and pictorial information forms. Manipulating
both independent variables in a single experi-
ment permits the individual and joint influence
of these display characteristics to be directly
measured, enhancing the generalizability of the
results. A particularly powerful way to design
such studies is through the use of within-subject
designs in which a decision maker is presented
with different displays of the same problem (e.g.,
Stone & Schkade, in press). One advantage of
this type of design is statistical power, which can
help to compensate for the fact that the effort re-
quired for data coding can limit the number of
subjects used in process-tracing studies.
In studying display issues that have been
raised in practice, analyzing displays in terms of
form, organization, and sequence may be help-
ful. For example, the research comparing tables
versus graphs has typically confounded form and
organization. Consider a study that presents a
set of observations of some variable either as a
table of numbers or as frequencies on a bar chart.
These two displays use different forms (numbers
versus bars) but also use different organizations
(a rectangular array versus a profile of the den-
sity of observations). In this study, there is no
way to determine whether any effects on decision
making are due to differences between the dis-
plays in form or in organization. A design that
disentangles these two factors would need to in-
clude a display that combines bars with a rectan-
gular array (e.g., a table composed of bars whose
heights represent individual data values) and an-
other that combines numbers with a density pro-
file (e.g., stem-and-leaf diagrams; Tukey, 1977,
ch. 1). Examining all four combinations permits
us to determine whether differences result from
the unique combinations of display characteris-
tics rather than the individual influences of form
and organization.
In a similar vein, there are task features that
are known to influence strategy selection (e.g.,
problem size, response mode, similarity of al-
ternatives, presence of dominated alternatives;
Payne, 1982). These features should be included
as independent variables to help evaluate the
generalizability of display effects. For instance,
suppose a particular display characteristic has
an impact on decision strategies only when the
problem is large. The only way to verify this is
to manipulate both problem size and display in
the same experiment. One reason why different
studies of the same display characteristic in the
same task might produce seemingly conflicting
results is that these other task features are not
comparable across those studies.
Differences in decision maker knowledge may
moderate the effects of displays on strategy se-
lection. For example, in new or unfamiliar tasks
a decision maker will have limited knowledge
about strategies and will consider only a sub-
set of the available strategies (e.g., Kleinmuntz
& Thomas, 1987). In contrast, in familiar tasks
the decision maker may have a large repertoire
of standard decision strategies. Predictions of
the influence of a display on strategy selection
would have to account for differences in the set
of strategies considered. Similarly, if a decision
maker is unfamiliar with a particular type of dis-
play, certain operations may be quite difficult.
Over time, the decision maker may learn how
use the display more effectively, making those
operations less effortful. This shift in cognitive
incentives could lead to differences in strategy
selection with the same display.
4.3 Anticipations and Experiences
Previous cost-benefit research has typically as-
sumed that decision makers learn over time
18 Kleinmuntz and Schka.de
about the effects of varying task features on ef-
fort and accuracy. Consequently, strategy selec-
tion has only been analyzed in terms of expe-
rienced effort and accuracy. To the extent that
anticipations differ from experiences, it is impor-
tant for display research to maintain the distinc-
tion between the two. Research on the relation
between display characteristics and anticipations
promises to produce useful results.
To illustrate, the three display characteris-
tics identified earlier (form, organization, and
sequence) may have qualitatively different influ-
ences on a decision maker's anticipations. In
particular, the influence of some display manip-
ulations will be easier to detect and anticipate
than others. Consider presenting all the infor-
mation simultaneously on a single screen versus
presenting information divided across a sequence
of screens. It is easy for the decision maker to
observe the difference between these two display
organizations and anticipate that the ease of lo-
cating a particular item of information will differ
between them. Finding an item of information
that might be on one of a number of screens
will obviously involve the extra effort of switch-
ing from screen to screen until the information
has been located. On the other hand, from the
decision maker's perspective, once the item is
located, this organization manipulation will ap-
pear to have little effect on the ease of encoding
the item or combining it with other information
already in memory.
In contrast, information form will appear to
have just the opposite effect—little if any in-
fluence on search and acquisition, but a large
influence on encoding and combination opera-
tions. Consider presenting information either
using numbers or equivalent verbal categories.
If one holds organization constant (e.g., use a
tabular display and replace the numbers with
words), then from the decision maker's perspec-
tive, the anticipated effort required to locate any
particular item of information is unaffected by
the form manipulation. On the other hand, the
information combination phase of decision mak-
ing may require computing sums or differences,
which will appear to be much harder with words.
In these two examples, we hypothesize that
display organization primarily influences antic-
ipations about information search and acquisi-
tion, while display form primarily influences an-
ticipations about information combination and
evaluation. This difference could be critical in
determining the relation between anticipations
and experiences because display changes that
influence early stages of the decision process
(i.e., information search and acquisition) may
have a greater effect on anticipations than dis-
play changes that influence later stages (i.e.,
combination and evaluation of information). A
decision maker may not be able to foresee all
the steps necessary to complete a complex task.
Consequently, those task features that are antic-
ipated to have a large influence on early stages
of the decision process may then have an inordi-
nate influence on anticipations about the overall
task. If decision makers base their anticipations
for the whole task primarily on the parts they
can see at the outset, then anticipations of over-
all effort and accuracy may be biased.
In contrast to form and organization, varia-
tion in information sequence may not be appar-
ent to the decision maker at the outset of the
task, and the decision maker may not be able to
anticipate sequence effects at all. For instance,
in a choice task, one could arrange to present
either the choice alternatives or the attributes
in different orders. Research on agendas in de-
cision making suggest that presenting decision-
relevant information in a constrained order can
influence the probability of a particular alterna-
tive being chosen (Hauser, 1986; Hulland, 1988;
Plott k Levine, 1978; Tversky & Sattath, 1979).
For instance, suppose we know a decision maker
intends to use a satisficing strategy (i.e., a con-
junctive strategy) and we wish to increase the
chance that one alternative is chosen over some
others. The display could be arranged so that
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the favored alternatives are presented first (e.g.,
arranging the sequence of flights listed on an air-
line reservation system so one company's flights
are listed ahead of the competition). If the de-
cision maker evaluates alternatives in the order
presented on the display, then the first accept-
able alternative is likely to be the favored one.
An important aspect of this example is that
the favored alternative is more likely to be se-
lected only if the decision maker is unaware of
the sequence manipulation. Decision makers
who know about the manipulation may be able
to anticipate the effect it will have on choice out-
comes and possibly switch to a strategy that is
not subject to the manipulation (e.g., a strat-
egy that does not choose an alternative until all
other alternatives have been examined). How-
ever, changes in information sequence can be
quite subtle, so decision makers may not be able
to detect them on their own. This highlights the
fact that understanding the relation between dis-
plays and strategy selection will require an anal-
ysis of both anticipations and experiences.
4.4 Extensions to Other System Fea-
tures
Our discussion has been based on a simplify-
ing assumption that warrants further discus-
sion: Specifically, we have assumed that dis-
play characteristics do not affect other features
of the task. However, decision support sys-
tems are capable of modifying not only the dis-
play of a problem, but the underlying struc-
ture as well. These modifications could include
adding variables (e.g., new information retrieved
from a database or summary measures com-
puted from other variables), removing variables
(e.g., screening out redundant or irrelevant in-
formation), adding decision alternatives (e.g.,
searching remote databases), and removing al-
ternatives (e.g., screening out inferior alterna-
tives). In more complex tasks, a wide variety
of model-based or knowledge-based inferences,
predictions, and evaluations are possible (for an
overview, see Zachary, 1986).
The effort-accuracy approach can be readily
extended to these system features. For instance,
if the computer performs operations that might
otherwise be left to the decision maker, com-
putationally intensive strategies become cogni-
tively less costly, and the decision maker has
less incentive to avoid them. Similarly, "trans-
ferring computational operations to the system
may reduce the number of errors, since the com-
puter performs with greater consistency (Bow-
man, 1963; Dawes, 1979). However, it seems
likely that factors other than effort and accu-
racy will need to be included in these cost-benefit
trade-offs. For example, although providing
summary measures might potentially increase
accuracy and decrease effort, decision makers
may reject them if they lack credibility and ac-
ceptance (Russo et al., 1986). Credibility is-
sues may be even more pronounced when more
sophisticated system capabilities are considered
(e.g., model- or knowledge- based inferences; also
see Fischhoff, 1980; Kleinmuntz, 1990). While
effort and accuracy are important determinants
of decision behavior, they are not the only im-
portant factors.
On the other hand, treating the decision
maker's cognitive strategy as a variable that me-
diates the relation between system features and
system effectiveness is a general approach that
may prove to be useful. For instance, in a re-
cent study, Todd and Benbasat (1989) used the
cost-benefit approach to successfully predict the
impact of decision aids on decision strategies. Of
particular interest was an experiment in which
they influenced strategy selection by selectively
adding certain capabilities to a decision support
tool: When provided with tools that explicitly
reduced the effort required to use a particular
substrategy, decision makers were observed to
shift toward use of strategies that relied upon
that substrategy. These results support the cost-
benefit approach in general as well as the specific
focus on cognitive effort in strategy selection.
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An interesting issue in designing decision sup-
port systems is whether or not the decision
maker should be given control over the choice
of display or other system features (Sprague k
Carlson, 1982, chapter 5; also see Silver, 1988a,
1988b). A system can provide varying degrees
of flexibility to the decision maker: The designer
could completely predetermine the set of display
characteristics or could design the system to pro-
vide either a small or large set of alternative dis-
play characteristics, thereby permitting the deci-
sion maker to select among those characteristics
each time the system is used. Flexibility pro-
vides the decision maker with the opportunity
to actively influence the cognitive incentives cre-
ated by the task and the display. For example, if
a decision maker wishes to use a particular strat-
egy, then a display that facilitates that strategy
can be selected. While allowing decision makers
to alter the display to suit their own preferences
seems appealing, there is the danger that the de-
cision maker will only reinforce bad habits, par-
ticularly when decision makers suffer from mis-
perceptions about the effort and accuracy asso-
ciated with different strategies. At present, em-
pirical evidence relating to the impact of flexi-
bility on decision processes is extremely limited.
Dos Santos and Bariff (1988) found better per-
formance when a system provided guidance in
use of models, but did not collect any process
data. Further research on strategy selection in
a variety of complex tasks will lead to a better
understanding of the implications of allocating
flexibility to the decision maker.
4.5 Conclusion
We have proposed that a theoretical understand-
ing of cognitive processes in decision making can
be useful for predicting and explaining the influ-
ence of information displays. This perspective is
needed because previous display research has fo-
cused almost exclusively on the relation between
the display and decision outcomes, with rela-
tively little attention to the intervening relation
between displays and decision processes. Given
the confusing and inconsistent state of knowl-
edge about display characteristics, a careful pro-
gram of research based on cognitive approach
has the potential to produce a new understand-
ing of display effects that should ultimately lead
to practical design guidelines. A cost-benefit ap-
proach seems particularly appropriate since sys-
tem designers routinely make implicit trade-offs
about users' cognitive costs and benefits. Mak-
ing those trade-offs explicit has the potential to
improve the usefulness of computer-based deci-
sion aids and, ultimately, lead to more effective
decision making.
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